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ABSTRACT 
 
The South African state awards unconditional means-tested cash transfers to 
the caregivers of some eight million poor children. Amidst increasing 
demands on the state for social assistance, the question has been asked: 
should the Child Support Grant (CSG) be made conditional on education or 
health related behaviour to enhance its effectiveness? Issues relating to the 
popular Latin American conditional cash transfer programmes for children 
are summarised. The history, current reach and impact of the CSG are 
described, as well as administrative strengths and weaknesses in delivery. 
We argue that, to be in line with South Africa’s Constitution, the structural 
problems of the supply side of education and health provision should be 
addressed, as well as problems with the delivery of the CSG, rather than 
considering whether to impose conditionalities that could further exclude 
poor children and their caregivers from this modest but vital form of support. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Cash transfers are one of a range of measures for addressing poverty. A 
regular amount of money is allocated directly to particular groups such as 
the elderly, the unemployed, or children. Cash transfers differ from in-kind 
interventions, such as the provision of food or food stamps, in that the 
former give the recipient choice about how to spend the money. 
 
The nature and extent of cash transfers (CTs) that a country provides can be 
viewed as a reflection of its welfare regime. Indeed Esping-Andersen (1990) 
based his well known typology of welfare states on the extent to which a 
state, through its transfer schemes, de-commodifies labour. A country with 
residual means tested provision such as South Africa would typically fall 
into his ‘liberal’ classification. Liberal welfare regimes are characteristically 
associated with ideologies which see the causes of poverty rooted in 
individual pathologies rather than having structural causes. Such liberal 
regimes tend to place the responsibility for exiting poverty firmly on the 
individual (Handa & Davis 2006; Schubert & Slater 2006). Consequently the 
role of the state in poverty alleviation through CTs is seen as undesirable. 
Often such transfers, where made, will be buttressed with conditions to 
ensure that the poor ‘take responsibility’ for their own redemption from 
poverty. To some extent this is a crude over-simplification – there are some 
countries which would otherwise be thought of as social democratic regimes 
where conditionality is attached to state transfers (Kildal 2001). However, 
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the defining feature of such social security systems is that their 
conditionalities tend to positively support the individual in, for example, a 
return to work, and they are characterised by significant state financial 
commitment (OECD 2003). In liberal regimes in contrast the focus is often 
on creating barriers to inclusion in the social assistance scheme with an 
explicit or covert agenda to reduce social security expenditure (Quinn & 
Magill 1994).  
 
A simple taxonomy of CTs distinguishes between non means tested and 
means tested benefits. Non means tested benefits can be contributory, such 
as unemployment insurance, where the worker, employer and the state make 
contributions, or non-contributory (categorical), such as Child Benefit in the 
UK, payable to all children of specified ages. Means tested benefits are 
referred to as social assistance and may be either unconditional or 
conditional. 
 
In an unconditional programme, once a person qualifies to enter the scheme, 
the amount is an entitlement, for a fixed period. The current South African 
CSG is an example of a means tested unconditional social assistance transfer 
in respect of children. It was introduced in 1998 as one of a fairly extensive 
system of relatively unconditional benefits which go to children, people with 
disabilities and elderly people. The system of social assistance has continued 
to expand since 1994, even in the context of the overall neo-liberal macro-
economic policy. In early 2006, the three main grants reached well over one 
quarter of the total population of 44 million: 6.98 million children were 
beneficiaries of the CSG, 2.25 million the Old Age Grant, and 1.3 million 
the Disability Grant (Budlender & Woolard 2006).  
 
Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) formally require some type of behavioural 
compliance on the part of recipients. CCTs relating to children have a 
lengthy pedigree (Farrington & Slater 2006). As early as 1987 some states in 
the USA had used the waivers afforded by the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act 1981 to introduce requirements for school attendance as a 
condition of receipt of Aid for Families with Dependant Children. These 
programmes, collectively referred to as ‘Learnfare’, were typically coercive 
rather than supportive and conformed to the liberal ideology referred to 
above (Quinn & Magill 1994). 
 
The south has recently seen the rapid spread of CCTs, based primarily on 
evidence of their impacts in Latin American countries. CCTs relate to both 
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poverty reduction strategies and the Millennium Development Goals and 
their main focus is children. They aim to address short-term poverty by 
providing poor households with cash income, and in the long-term, through 
health-related and education-related behaviour, their goal is to break the 
inter-generation transmission of poverty by building children’s ‘human 
capital’. 
 
One effect of the South African political transition was to make grants more 
accessible, especially to rural people, and this together with HIV/AIDS is 
leading to increased demands for social assistance, especially for the 
Disability and the Foster Child Grants. In the face of these and other 
pressures, the idea of conditionality is gaining favour in South Africa. 
 
This paper focuses on South African cash transfers in respect of children in 
poor households. First, the impressive evidence for the reach and impact of 
major CCT programmes, particularly in Latin America, is reviewed and 
emerging problems are identified (Section 2). The background to the South 
African CSG, including conditionalities that were considered in its design, is 
discussed (Section 3). The patterns of take-up and reach of this grant are 
analysed and evidence from early assessments of its impact is presented 
(Section 4). A classification of characteristics, requirements and 
conditionalities that have to be fulfilled to access social assistance is 
detailed, and using evidence from studies of the CSG it is shown how some 
formal conditionalities have been imposed, and how some administrative 
requirements have become de facto conditionalities (Section 5). Finally the 
appropriateness of conditionality in South Africa is considered in the light of 
the available research evidence and given the type of welfare regime 
promised for South Africa in both the Constitution and in high level policy 
documents. The arguments for attaching conditionalities to nutrition, 
attendance at Early Childhood Development (ECD) facilities, and school 
performance are considered. It is suggested that these are primarily supply-
side problems which would not be improved by introducing further 
conditionalities. Instead, the systemic problems should be tackled in line 
with the Administrative Justice Act (AJA) and with Batho Pele (‘People 
First’) principles (Section 6). 
 
2. CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMES 
 
Child-oriented CCT programmes are familiar in industrialised countries, and 
a range of CCT programmes has recently been introduced in Latin America, 
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the largest of which are Mexico’s Oportunidades (formerly Progresa), a 
health, education and nutrition programme, and Brazil’s Bolsa Escola 
(‘school stipend’), which respectively reach four million and five million 
households (Rawlings & Rubio 2005). In Brazil, eight cash transfer 
programmes have now combined into Bolsa Familia (‘family stipend’) and 
together reach eight million or 15.5 per cent of Brazilian households (Soares 
et al. 2006). Other countries with CCTs include Bolivia, Colombia, 
Honduras, Jamaica and Nicaragua.  
 
The focus of conditionalities is to a greater or lesser degree on poverty 
alleviation, civic responsibility, investment in human capital, and 
maintaining existing human capital. CCTs require that beneficiaries change 
their behaviour in certain ways, and assume that money will enable the 
recipient to do so. In other words, they assume that it is a cash constraint that 
is keeping the recipient from, for example, going to health services or 
school; that health services and schools exist; that cash is the appropriate 
incentive to encourage attendance; and that improved health status and 
school attendance will impact on school achievement, and thereby improve 
life chances. 
 
Different programmes have different characteristics, but typically, monthly 
or bi-monthly cash grants are given to the mothers of children of school-
going age or younger in poor households. The transfer is conditioned on 
health-related and education-related behaviours. In health, usual 
requirements are that all family members must be taken to the health 
services a minimum number of times and mothers must attend health 
education classes. In education, a child must attend school for a certain 
number of days, for example, 75 or 85 per cent of school days in a year. 
Some programmes make continuation of benefits conditional on school 
performance as well. Some specifically give a larger transfer for girls, to 
address the fact that they have significantly lower enrolment and attendance 
figures than boys. In addition to the health and education requirements, some 
programmes require parents (mothers) to attend community meetings, or do 
some hours of ‘community work’. 
 
Programmes vary significantly in terms of the ages of children that they 
target. Under fives are often the focus of the health component of the CCTs: 
Bolsa Escola includes those from six to 15 years old, in grades 1 to 8; 
Progresa focuses on children up to the age of 18, including grades 3 to 9; 
and the Programa Nacional de Becas Estudiantiles (‘national programme of 
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student scholarships’, commonly known as Becas) in Argentina is used as a 
means to encourage transition to and progression through senior school 
(Heinrich 2006). Programmes vary also in the extent to which they focus on 
child labour. 
 
Eligibility for CCT programmes is determined by a wide range of 
assessments of poverty. The most stringent (and costly) is the verification of 
household income. The amount of the transfer itself is based on some 
criterion connected with the programme purpose. It can be set according to 
an assessment of a poverty level, sometimes by determining direct costs of 
programme participation, such as transport to get to health services, as well 
as by determining the opportunity costs of fulfilling the conditions for 
receiving the transfer. 
 
An innovative aspect of many of these programmes is that, while they target 
children and families, the money is paid to the mother rather than to the 
father or the household head. Some programmes have as an explicit 
objective that this should lead to ‘women empowerment’; in others, the 
payment to mothers is grounded more in the international evidence which 
shows that money will be spent ‘better’, in terms of children’s health and 
education, if it goes to women. 
 
CCT programmes, especially Progresa, have been extensively and 
rigorously evaluated as part of programme design, with most countries 
conducting randomised experimental and control studies (Rawlings & Rubio 
2005). The assessments are positive about most aspects of the programmes. 
In summary, they show that they can be well targeted, and work effectively 
as incentives for investing in human capital (syntheses can be found in 
Skoufias 2005; de la Briere & Rawlings 2006; Rawlings 2004; Rawlings & 
Rubio 2005).  
 
In Bolsa Escola and Programa de Erradicacao do Trabalho Infantil in 
Brazil, Progresa, and the pilot for the Red de Proteccion Social (RPS) in 
Nicaragua, the CCTs had a dramatic effect on school enrolment and 
attendance, while Becas increased attendance, reduced repetition rates, and 
improved school performance (Heinrich 2006).  
 
With regard to child labour, programmes have reduced the probability of 
children working, with a stronger effect for boys than for girls. In Nicaragua, 
the pilot RPS reduced the probability of children working in high risk 
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activities. There, although after-school activities were available to all school 
children, only the CCT programme children actually spent increased hours 
attending, suggesting that it was the incentives that led to the behaviour 
change (Rawlings 2004). 
 
In terms of health, again most of the evidence is positive. The Mexican, 
Brazilian and Nicaraguan programmes all resulted in an increase in nutrition 
monitoring, in immunisation rates, and in growth rates (Behrman & 
Hoddinot 2000; Maluccio & Flores 2005; Rawlings & Rubio 2005). 
Furthermore Progresa reduced illness in children (Gertler 2004), as well as 
sick leave days for adults. The nutritional supplement has been the least 
successful of the health components, with families diluting the supplement 
to make it stretch further, or sharing it with all household members, thus 
weakening the intended focus on the nutritional status of children under five 
(Rawlings & Rubio 2005).  
 
Most assessments judge the routing of the CCT via the mother to have 
contributed towards women’s sense of self-esteem and self-confidence, as 
well as giving them control over (part of) the household purse. Evaluations 
of Progresa have also pointed to the way in which the programmes have 
raised awareness of the importance of girls’ education (Adato 2000; Adato, 
Coady et al. 2000; Adato, de la Briere et al. 2000). 
 
A number of problematic areas would be expected in new programmes that 
have grown so rapidly. The first concerns gender relations. A quantitative 
and qualitative assessment of the effect of Progresa on women’s status and 
intra-household relations found that the programme had indeed led to an 
increase in women’s sense of their own empowerment. The programme 
placed extra demands on women’s time, but the women found it worthwhile 
if the result was better chances of schooling for their children (Adato, de la 
Briere et al. 2000); however, they expressed the wish that their husbands 
would attend the education classes as well. Molyneux (2006) on the other 
hand offers a strong critique of Progresa as a maternalist programme 
suggesting that the programmes place additional demands on women’s 
scarce time, and they are expected to juggle multiple paid and unpaid work 
activities even further.  
 
Second, the long-term effects of the CCT programmes in addressing poverty 
are not yet known, as they have been in existence for only a decade. In what 
circumstances will the proven increased educational attendance, and 
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performance, be translated into increased opportunities for moving out of 
poverty? Four factors have been identified as mediating the relationship: the 
quality of education, rates of employment, the ability of the labour market to 
absorb labour, and rates of return to education (Bourguignon et al. 2002). 
With regard to the employment that is available to young people when 
leaving school, in most developing countries, informal employment 
including self-employment constitutes the larger part of all employment. 
Thus critical in the quality of schooling is whether schooling equips children 
with the idea that many will have to make their own work, rather than find 
work provided by someone else, and whether the curriculum offered will 
enhance their chances of doing so successfully. The question that needs to be 
answered is what level of schooling, of what sort, is necessary to make a 
difference to both finding and making work? 
 
Third, it is not yet clear whether it was the conditionality that made the 
difference, or whether just the cash itself would have achieved the same 
effects (Gertler 2004). A Brazilian study compared the targeting and poverty 
reduction effects of the unconditional benefit for elderly and disabled people 
with the conditional Bolsa Escola (Soares et al. 2006). Both were well-
targeted to the poor, and both had marked and similar effects on poverty 
reduction. Conditionalities impose costs on programmes, but assessing such 
costs is complex.  
 
Finally, most conditional programmes assume that there is a demand-side 
problem that can be attended to by providing incentives to individuals. 
Increasingly, evaluations of the CCTs suggest this is a limitation, and that 
supply-side problems need to be addressed as an integral part of programmes 
(Rawlings & Rubio 2005). Nicaragua and Honduras, for example, have 
invested part of programme money into improving educational infrastructure 
(Caldes et al. 2004). It is suggested that long term benefits are reliant on 
better schooling provision and better health services.  
 
Having reviewed the evidence from the conditional transfer programmes in 
Latin America, we turn to the unconditional transfer in South Africa.  
 
3. THE SOUTH AFRICAN CHILD SUPPORT GRANT 
 
State social assistance in South Africa started in 1929 with the introduction 
of Old Age Pensions for the white and coloured population, and then later 
the inclusion of all racial groups. It grew over the course of the last century 
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to include support for people with disabilities, and for families, women and 
children. Cash transfers were means tested for income and assets, and 
payable from general revenue. At its inception, and then under the apartheid 
regime, there was racial discrimination in every aspect of the system, in 
racially separate administrations, level of payments, income testing, and in 
timing and method of payment (Lund 1993). In anticipation of the transition 
to democracy, and the need to forge uniformity between the different welfare 
administrations with respect to welfare entitlements, the mid-to-late 1980s 
saw the gradual equalisation of benefits and administrative procedures 
across the differently classified racial groups. By September 1993, most of 
the inequalities had been removed from the main welfare grants for elderly 
and for disabled people (Republic of South Africa 1996). 
 
Severe inequality remained in the State Maintenance Grant (SMG). This 
grant had been designed to support poor women and their children up to the 
age of 18, where the woman had been widowed or abandoned, or the father 
had been committed to a state institution. All racial groups were eligible for 
this means tested grant, but in 1993 the SMG went mainly to coloured and 
Indian women and children (50 and 40 per thousand children respectively). 
Only 13 per thousand white children received it, because of wealth levels, 
while very few of the poorest African women could access it: in 1993 it 
went to only one in a thousand African children (Republic of South Africa 
1996). Eight million African people lived in the Bantustan areas, where the 
welfare departments by and large did not administer this grant. Social 
workers also appeared to act as gatekeepers who approved of pensions for 
elderly and disabled people, but not for younger single women and children. 
A committee of enquiry was established in 1996 to investigate all forms of 
child and family support, and one major recommendation was to replace the 
SMG with a CSG.  
 
The CSG was initially available to children from birth to their seventh 
birthday, and then extended in three phases to include children up to their 
fourteenth birthday. In making the award to the child’s ‘primary caregiver’, 
the CSG broke with former welfare convention which was to channel child-
oriented support only through biological parents or legally defined adoptive 
or foster parents. This was an attempt to deal with specific aspects of South 
African society which had emerged over the periods of colonialism and then 
apartheid: the absence of many parents, especially fathers who went to the 
towns, mines or white-owned farms to work; customary marriages and 
customary polygamy; fluid and mobile household structures; and high rates 
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of caring by grandmothers and aunts. All of these characteristics were 
present before the advent of HIV/AIDS; they have become more pronounced 
since. 
 
The value of the CSG when introduced in April 1998 was R100 per month 
per beneficiary and in July 2006 the grant was valued at R190. As such it 
was much smaller than the R820 per month grants for elderly people and 
people with disabilities. The committee recommending this cash transfer 
initially wanted a universal benefit for all children of a certain age, both as 
an appeal to solidarity under the new non-racial regime, and because, given 
widespread poverty, means testing is inefficient and costly. A compromise 
was reached on what was to have been a simple means test based on the 
income of the primary caregiver and her/his spouse or partner, and with 
differentials for urban/rural location and for type of dwelling unit. Everyone 
who qualifies according to the means test is paid at the same rate. 
 
A number of policy options other than an unconditional cash transfer were 
considered. If the SMG was to be phased out, then that R1.3 billion budget 
item could be diverted to somewhere else in the welfare budget, rather than 
be lost. Alternatives needed to have institutional capacity, deliver on a 
relatively large scale, and redress racial and spatial inequities in welfare 
provision. Support for Early Childhood Development (which in South Africa 
is defined to include children up to their tenth birthday) was one alternative 
but the sector was institutionally weak at that time. There was strong support 
for child nutrition, but experts argued that, given current government policy 
and capacity, a CT was likely to be more effective than in-kind nutrition 
supplements or food vouchers for children. General child welfare services in 
South Africa had been severely under-funded, and would come under 
increasing pressure with the spread of AIDS. However, they were seen as 
complementary, rather than an alternative to CTs.  
 
It was decided to concentrate on children in their earliest years. In South 
Africa, the vast majority of children are born into the health services, then 
have no contact with public institutions until they attend school. The CSG 
aimed to address vulnerability during this period, in the form of a CT, to 
very young children, related to some measure of the costs of nutrition of 
children at this age. 
 
In designing the CSG, a number of measures were considered that would 
increase synergies with primary health care, improve on current delivery 
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systems, and lower costs to the poor, while recognising that taking up 
entitlement simply does bear some cost. A basic administrative requirement 
was that the primary caregiver applying for the benefit had to have an 
identity document, and the child a birth certificate. 
 
Health-related conditionalities were considered. One was for applicants to 
have a Road to Health card (which included both growth monitoring and 
immunisation status). Another was to move from a complicated and costly 
annual review mechanism that was applied to other social grants, to a single 
visit to the health services when the child was between 24 and 30 months 
old, the period in which child health services are most concerned to check 
immunisation and overall health status. Both these ideas were turned down 
by the health ministry at the time; the Road to Health card was re-introduced 
later as a requirement. 
 
4. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE CHILD SUPPORT GRANT 
 
In order to assess whether conditionalities would be appropriate in the 
case of the CSG, it is necessary first to assess the present performance of the 
grant both in terms of take-up and reach, and in terms of the extent to which 
it alleviates poverty and supports the development of human capital. It is 
unwise to draw firm conclusions about the performance of a programme in 
existence for only a decade. Nevertheless databases exist which have 
allowed reliable early assessments of the CSG even in the absence of 
randomised experimental studies. 
 
Eligibility and take-up  
Table 1 provides information about the proportion of children under eleven 
whose caregivers were eligible to receive the CSG in January 2005. This is 
calculated by dividing the number of children under eleven who have an 
eligible caregiver by the total number of children under eleven. This can be 
seen as a measure of the prevalence of children living in low income 
families in an area. 
 
Nationally, in January 2005, 7.39 million children under eleven were eligible 
to receive the CSG and there were 10.96 million children under eleven in 
total. This means that the caregivers of 67 per cent of children were 
potentially eligible to receive the CSG. Given the provincial differentiation 
in poverty levels, there is considerable variation in terms of the potential 
reach of the CSG at provincial level: 41 per cent of children under eleven in 
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the Western Cape have caregivers who are estimated to be eligible for CSG, 
while 79 per cent of children under eleven in both Limpopo and the Eastern 
Cape have caregivers who are estimated to be eligible for the grant. 
 
Table 1 Proportion of 0-10 year olds whose caregivers are eligible to 
receive the CSG (January 2005) 
 
Province Children aged 0-10 
whose caregivers 
are eligible 
Children aged 0-10 Eligibility rate 
(%) 
Western Cape  386300 950800 40.6
Eastern Cape  1390300 1759500 79.0
Northern Cape  134000 209400 64.0
Free State  470800 659200 71.4
KwaZulu-Natal  1782200 2400600 74.2
North West  629700 892100 70.6
Gauteng  808200 1754600 46.1
Mpumalanga  585200 820900 71.3
Limpopo  1199500 1518400 79.0
South Africa 7386100 10965600 67.4
Source: Noble et al., 2005. 
 
Take-up rates for January 2004 and January 2005 are compared in Table 2. 
The take-up rate for South Africa as a whole for the relevant age groups 
increased from 63 to 71 per cent between January 2004 and January 2005. In 
terms of take-up for under nines only, the increase was greater, changing 
from 63 to 73 per cent. This suggests that take-up is lower for the nine and 
ten year olds who only became eligible for the CSG in April 2004, and that 
this age group brought down the overall take-up rate for January 2005 
(Noble et al. 2005). For the relevant age groups, all provinces saw an 
increase in take-up rate over the year; the Eastern Cape and North West 
Province had the greatest increase at thirteen percentage points, while 
KwaZulu-Natal had only a two percentage point increase. The take-up rates 
for under nines only also increased between January 2004 and January 2005.  
 
Table 2 Take up of CSG at provincial level 
 
Province January 2004 
take up rate 0-8 
year olds (%)
January 2005 
take up rate 0-8 
year olds (%)
January 2005 
take up rate 0-10 
year olds (%)
Western Cape 78.7 88.5 84.0
Eastern Cape 53.5 68.2 66.3
Northern Cape 58.9 63.4 62.7
CONDITIONALITY AND CASH TRANSFERS FOR CHILDREN IN SOUTH AFRICA 11 
Free State 57.5 66.4 64.5
KwaZulu-Natal 61.9 68.3 64.3
North West 59.1 73.7 72.0
Gauteng 75.4 84.4 83.3
Mpumalanga 67.2 74.6 73.7
Limpopo 67.8 74.1 73.9
South Africa 63.5 72.9 70.7
Source: Noble et al., 2005. 
 
Poverty alleviation and human capital development 
All studies to date show good targeting for poverty, except that some 
fraction of the very poorest are excluded (Budlender & Woolard 2006; 
Barrientos and DeJong 2006; Case et al. 2005).  
 
The income thresholds for the means test have stayed the same since 
inception (Leatt 2004) meaning that only the extremely poor are now 
included, and there has been inconsistency with the way urban and rural 
areas are defined for the purposes of the means test, which excludes many 
who should be eligible (Budlender et al. 2005; Goldblatt et al. 2006; Hall 
2005). 
 
School attendance rates among young children are high across all racial 
groups, with attendance rates for six, seven and eight year olds at 83, 97 and 
98 per cent respectively (Budlender & Woolard 2006). The Umkhanyakude 
study of 10 000 households in KwaZulu-Natal found that receipt of the CSG 
led to an eight per cent increase in school enrolment among six year olds, 
remarkable because households were also shown to be poor, and enrolment 
rates already high (Case et al. 2005). The 2004 General Household Survey 
showed a small but positive link between the CSG and school attendance 
(Budlender & Woolard 2006).  
 
No existing database contains both CSG and child labour data (Budlender & 
Woolard 2006). South Africa does not (yet) have a serious problem of child 
labour, and there is no evidence that school attendance is significantly 
affected by withdrawal of children in order to work.  
 
5. CONDITIONALITIES OR CONDITIONS OF ENTITLEMENT? 
 
In South Africa, conditionality is presently being used to mean different 
things. Some (Goldblatt et al. 2006) refer to the requirement of an ID as a 
conditionality, and others (Budlender & Woolard 2006) restrict it to 
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requirements such as signing up for development programmes or getting 
immunisations. An attempt is made here to distinguish between various 
factors, some of which are conditionalities.  
  
With unconditional transfers, the Constitution or other legislation defines a 
right which becomes a material entitlement for a person with certain 
characteristics who meets certain qualifications. When conditionality is 
introduced, the applicant meeting certain requirements to get the benefit 
must in addition conduct him or herself in certain ways in order to continue 
receiving it. Some things which are not conditionalities, however, act to 
exclude some who are eligible, and there are sometimes blurred lines 
between conditionalities and other requirements. 
It is useful to distinguish between the following. 
 
First, there are the characteristics of the person which are needed to qualify, 
such as being of a certain age, or being disabled. These are not 
conditionalities.  
 
Second, there are administrative requirements such as possession of a birth 
certificate or proof of citizenship. These are not conditionalities, but do act 
as barriers to access. The home affairs department which issues documents 
has had difficulties with delivery, and the repeat visits and long delays 
present significant opportunity costs, in terms of time and money spent on 
the process, and in the grant income foregone (Waddell, 2002). Proof of 
socio-economic status is needed for the means test. This is not a 
conditionality, but is another forceful mechanism of exclusion. In the field 
the means test is unevenly applied, which could reflect the fact that it is a 
relatively new grant, with officials still learning the procedures, or that 
officials decide for themselves to what extent it should be applied.  
 
Other examples of administrative requirements are that applicants have also 
been asked for their marital status, marriage certificates and divorce decrees 
(Hall 2005) and particular districts or offices have imposed employment-
related requirements, asking applicants for an affidavit saying they were 
unemployed (Hall 2005) or requiring the applicant to produce the ‘brown 
card’ from the labour department stating the applicant has registered as 
unemployed and job-seeking (Children’s Institute 2005; Hall 2005). None of 
this is legally necessary, and all serve as barriers to access. 
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Third, there are requirements in the regulations, called ‘conditions’, such as 
‘the child has to be accommodated, fed and clothed’ and stipulating that the 
grant has to be spent on the child. These are normative injunctions. They 
cannot easily be monitored, and can allow for abuse of powers as they are 
not sufficiently rule-based. Some appear to be reasonable: the child must 
continue to be in the care of the person receiving the grant; the state must be 
allowed reasonable access to the child and the house that the child is residing 
in; the grant has to be spent on the child; and the grant is subject to periodic 
review. However, a specific requirement, that the child must have 
accommodation and be properly fed and clothed, is not reasonable given that 
the level of the grant is not linked to any objectively determined estimate of 
the costs of accommodation, clothing and food. The level of the CSG was 
initially linked only to nutritional cost, and the value of the grant has eroded 
over time. Providing shelter, food and clothing for children is a reasonable 
thing to expect parents to do, but this grant at its present value cannot enable 
it all to happen.  
 
Fourthly, there are requirements created that attempt to regulate conduct, 
some of which are in the regulations, for example immunisation, and some 
of which are ultra vires, for example providing proof of having sought 
private maintenance from the child’s father (Goldblatt 2005; Goldblatt & 
Yose 2004a, 2004b; Hall 2005). Such requirements begin to look like 
conditionalities, but could be interpreted as once-off conditions of 
entitlement. 
 
The possession of  the Road to Health Card appeared as a requirement in the 
1998 regulations, and then did not reappear in the amended 1999 
regulations. The 2002 regulations state that ‘(the caregiver) shall ensure that 
the child concerned receives immunisation and other health services where 
such services are available, without charge’. In the 2004 regulations (not yet 
implemented), the words ‘where such services are available, without charge’ 
have been removed from this clause.  
 
The onerous requirement of providing proof of having sought private 
maintenance did not appear in the 1999 regulations, yet as late as 2005, still 
appeared as part of procedures in a number of offices. 
  
Fifth and finally, there is the category of true conditionalities, where the 
beneficiary has to keep on doing something, such as attending school and/or 
accessing health services. Lack of compliance leads to partial or full loss of 
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the benefit. No such conditionalities legally exist in South Africa at the 
present time. In the administration of the CSG, some have been imposed that 
are outside of law, but formally encoded in official documents, while some 
are outside of law and the result of officials’ discretion, for example school 
attendance.  
 
School-related conditionalities were not considered in the design of the CSG 
not only because it was planned that it should be as unconditional as 
possible, but also because it was targeted at pre-school children, or to 
overlap only with the very first years of school. Had it been intended for 
older children, school-related conditionalities would not have made sense 
because of the high rates of primary school enrolment of both boys and girls 
in South Africa. The age extension of the CSG has led to some offices now 
imposing school-linked requirements which are conditionalities. Sometimes 
a letter from the school is required to confirm school enrolment or school 
attendance (Children’s Institute 2005; Hall 2005) or the police must certify 
school enrolment (Hall 2005).  
 
6. DISCUSSION 
 
The CSG has reached a large number of children in a relatively short period 
of time. Analyses show that it has been reaching rural areas, is well targeted 
for poverty, and appears to increase the length of time children are in school. 
It was designed as an unconditional benefit, with the exception of minimal 
qualifications to enable efficient administration, and one or two relatively 
minor requirements needed to create synergies with other departments, or 
minimise corruption. Over time, a range of additional requirements have 
been added, some of which amount to de facto conditionalities that are not 
always legal. In the transitional space in South Africa, bureaucrats have 
imposed their own rules. There are many examples of officials exercising 
discretion in favour of individual clients, or challenging punitive aspects of 
the regulations themselves. On the whole, however, administrative discretion 
appears to be subverting the aim of the broader social policy by imposing 
additional costs on the poor. In addition, spatial settlement patterns imposed 
by apartheid and lack of administrative capacity and inefficiency impose 
costs on those seeking access.  
 
There is no way of directly comparing the costs of administration of the 
unconditional South African CSG and the CCTs in Latin America, but it is 
possible to re-visit the problems that have been identified with the CCTs, 
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and see whether comparable issues might be experienced in the CSG, 
whether conditional or not. 
  
Some Latin American schemes have the empowerment of women as an 
explicit programme goal, assumed to be achieved by giving women the 
income, and through their attendance at group activities. Women have 
primary responsibility for signing up, and then for ensuring that children 
attend school, and family members go to the health services. In South 
Africa, the woman beneficiary is likewise primarily the conduit for the CSG 
and she assumes responsibility for the time-consuming application process. 
Women are faced with patriarchal forms of authority at every turn. Proof of 
residence (a requirement in some areas) has to come from the tribal authority 
(Goldblatt & Yose 2004a); affidavits of various kinds have to be secured at 
police stations, which are very masculine domains; applying for paternal 
maintenance is through a judicial procedure which is known to make women 
vulnerable. During screening procedures, monitors observed officials giving 
moralising lectures which were ‘patronising and inappropriate’ (Goldblatt & 
Yose 2004a). 
 
The Latin American CCT programmes have had positive effects on school 
performance. The South African CSG was initially aimed at children up to 
the age of seven. The age extension to fourteen years has led to some 
informal conditionalities being imposed, even though school attendance 
rates are good (though they may become less so with HIV/AIDS). Given the 
parlous quality of education for poor South Africans in both urban and rural 
areas, it is not necessarily getting children to school that matters in breaking 
long term poverty: it is about resources and facilities, or management, or 
teaching practice at schools (see Chisholm 2006: 202-203). It is a supply-
side problem, similar to that pointed out in Bourguignon et al. (2002) for 
Brazil, and by Britto (2004) for the CCT programmes in general. Poor 
teaching and lack of leadership in under-resourced schools are common, and 
there are low returns to education for a number of years. Enrolment and 
attendance are necessary conditions in trying to escape poverty, but they are 
not sufficient.  
 
One argument used for extending the age limit of the CSG was because of 
school costs. Regulations do not at present make it a conditionality that the 
child has to go to school. If this were ever introduced, it would require a 
massive increase in the amount of the grant, to compensate for expenses that 
should be paid by the education department, or, at least, should not be 
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funded through the welfare department. Expenses paid by households 
include school fees (fee exemption for children from poor households does 
not always happen in practice), school uniforms, and contributions to school 
cleaning equipment and building funds. 
 
Any attempt to create conditions such as family participation in livelihood 
activities is undesirable. This harks back to the conditionality initially 
imposed on the CSG which was for applicants to sign up for development 
projects. This was completely unreasonable given the fact that poverty often 
coincides with places where there are no such projects. Expectations that 
caregivers should attend health workshops would likewise impose additional 
costs on poor women, as suggested by Molyneux (2006). 
 
As noted in Section 2, a core question in the assessment of CCTs was 
whether it was the conditionality itself that made for such impressive 
positive impacts, or whether the cash alone would have achieved the same 
objectives. If conditionalities are to be considered in South Africa, what 
could likely candidates be? An official South Africa source mentioned 
exploring links with nutrition, ECD, and free primary health care (especially 
immunisation) (Plaatjies 2006: 10).  
 
With regard first to nutrition, there is a need for a national programme of 
support for nutrition for children in their earliest years. Children of school-
going age have access to the unevenly implemented National School 
Nutrition Programme, which reached about half of all primary school 
learners over the years 1994/5 to 2003/4 (Kallmann 2005:11). South Africa’s 
children need nutritional support most critically between birth and two years 
of age, but at this stage, there is no programme with which CSG children 
could be linked. Second, linking the CSG to attendance at an ECD facility 
will not address the fact that the lack of ECD participation is a supply-side 
problem, with only one in six children able to access them as there are too 
few facilities or they are too expensive (Department of Education 2001). 
Third, in terms of primary health care, there is free access for young 
children, though the service is uneven. It would seem reasonable to expect 
that in a society at South Africa’s level of development, immunisation 
should simply be a free and accessible service for all citizens, without 
linkages to other programmes.  
 
This review of the evidence suggests that introducing behavioural 
inducements to poor people in South Africa to ensure the best educational 
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and health outcomes for their children should not be the main focus of 
attention for policy makers. Such conditionalities would be inconsistent with 
the (essentially) social democratic social policy regime set out in the 
Constitution and the Reconstruction and Development Programme White 
Paper. In both documents the causes of poverty and unemployment are 
unambiguously stated as having a structural rather than personal aetiology – 
that is, they form part of the apartheid legacy. Chapter 2 of the Constitution 
comprises a Bill of Rights which sets out an unparalleled series of socio-
economic rights in respect of social security, health, education and housing. 
These rights speak to a set of inclusive social policies with a significant role 
for the state consistent with a social democratic welfare regime rather than 
residual minimalist welfare provision which typifies the liberal welfare 
regime. Conditional social security, based on assumptions that poor parents 
are in some way culpable if their children fail to attend school or attend 
clinics is inconsistent with the structural explanations for poverty which are 
implicit in the Constitution. 
 
The new South African government has done much to try and address and 
redress the racism and repressive aspects of the old apartheid state. It has 
introduced the Batho Pele (‘People First’) set of principles into 
administration to ensure fairer and more transparent service to the public, 
and an Administrative Justice Act (AJA), yet procedures in the 
implementation of the CSG contradict both. The AJA requires that ‘organs 
of state may not act capriciously and arbitrarily’ and ‘Decisions must be 
rationally related to the purpose for which the power was given’ (Currie & 
Klaaren 2001: 16-18), but it is clear that there is a great deal of 
administrative discretion. The requirement to apply for private maintenance 
has no rational relationship whatsoever to the CSG; the widespread habit of 
telling applicants to ‘come back within three weeks’ bears no relation to 
whether that is an appropriate time to return. Principle 8 of Batho Pele 
stipulates that ‘Public services should be provided economically and 
efficiently in order to give citizens the best value for money’, but poor 
people incur unreasonable costs in seeking and maintaining access to the 
system (Republic of South Africa 1997).  
 
It is widely acknowledged that there is a large gap between policy and 
implementation in post-apartheid South Africa, and this is no surprise given 
the ambitious hopes that there were for fundamental social, economic and 
political reforms. The CSG has rolled out very rapidly; by stealth, some of 
the policy intent is being subverted by administrative action. Patterns of 
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take-up suggest that the means test is an unnecessary and ineffective 
measure, and it should be lifted altogether or be replaced by a far simpler 
measure, as suggested by Goldblatt et al. (2006). Indeed, a universal 
categorical grant for children would sit with greater ease in what on paper 
appears to be a social democratic policy agenda.  
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